

Dartmouth Model United Nations

DISEC

April 7 – 9, 2017





DARTMOUTH MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

Twelfth Annual Conference • April 7 - 9, 2017

Dartmouth College • Rockefeller Center • Hanover, NH 03755

E-mail: dartmun@dartmouth.edu • DartmouthMUN.com

William Tremml
Secretary-General

January 11, 2017

Emily Choate
Director-General

Dear Delegates:

Bill Kosmidis
Chief of Staff

On behalf of the entire Dartmouth Model United Nations staff, I would like to welcome and thank you for registering for the twelfth annual Dartmouth Model United Nations conference this April 2017. We have been working relentlessly since the end of last year's conference to provide a better and more worthwhile Model U.N. experience for this winter's delegates. We are optimistic about this winter's conference and Dartmouth Model U.N.'s future.

Jessica Campinile
Chargé d'Affaires

DartMUN is a unique conference. We pair world-class delegations and dais staff members in smaller, more-interactive environments to facilitate an enriching experience for delegates of all skill levels. We believe DartMUN's active, small committees ensure delegates feel comfortable immersing themselves in a competitive but supportive environment that encourages trial by error and participation.

Clayton Jacques
*Undersecretary-General of
General Assemblies*

Furthermore, DartMUN's well-trained staff is excited to work with your delegates this winter in committee to equip the next generation of college students with the skills to tackle complex global problems.

Makisa Bronson
*Undersecretary-General of
Special Committees*

Scott Okuno
*Undersecretary-General of
Current Crisis Committees*

With this said, Model United Nations is only meaningful when delegates are thoroughly prepared. To aid in your research preparation, your committee staff has spent hours researching, writing, and editing this Background Guide. The Background Guide serves as an introduction to your respective committee and an overview of the topics that you will be debating over the course of the conference.

Lauren Bishop
*Undersecretary-General of
Historical Crisis Committees*

The Background Guide is intended to be a starting point for your research and is not, in itself, an adequate exposure to the complexities of your committee's topics. To be prepared, each delegate should do further research and focus on processing information through the lens of their respective country or position. If you are having trouble digesting all the information, the Background Guide contains relevant discussion questions that break down the topics. Also, as questions or ideas arise, do not be shy in contacting your committee staff via e-mail. Committee staff are knowledgeable and can help you better understand a particular topic or how your country fits into a larger international debate. More often than not, discussing the problem with another person can open up more paradigms and viewpoints that may guide you throughout the brainstorming process.

Zainab Molani
*Director of
Public Relations*

Michelle Wang
*Director of
Technology*

Eva Wang
*Director of
Finances*

As in years past, all delegates are expected to write a brief position paper before the conference to synthesize all of their preparatory research and analysis. Please see the position paper guidelines on the conference website for specific information about content, format, etc. Committee staff will collect position papers at the beginning of the first committee session on Friday evening, so be sure to bring a hard copy because delegates who do not submit position papers will not be eligible for awards.

Sincerely,

William Tremml
Secretary-General
DartMUN XII

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January 14, 2017

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to DartMUN's twelfth annual conference and the Disarmament, and International Security Committee. Our names are Erika Ogino and Jessica Kobsa, and we look forward to being your chairs for the duration of the conference. Erika will serve as the Committee Director while Jessica will act as the Assistant Director. We have been working very hard to make sure that this conference will be very enjoyable for you, and hope that this conference will be memorable.

To introduce ourselves, we are both freshmen at Dartmouth. I'm from New Jersey, but grew up living in five different countries. I have not yet declared my major, but hope to pursue a major in the STEM field. Model UN has been a part of my life throughout high school. I am grateful that I was able to continue Model UN at Dartmouth, and look forward to my very first conference as chair.

Jessica comes to Dartmouth from Wilton, Connecticut. Though she participated in many government simulations throughout high school that examined domestic topics, she is new to Model UN and is excited to learn about this new platform to stimulate international diplomacy. She is planning to major in neuroscience and possibly pursue a minor in public policy.

This year, DISEC will be covering pressing topics of nuclear terrorism and biological weapons. With the rise of extremism we have seen in the past few years, we hope that these topics and the debates that follow will be engaging.

As a member of the UN General Assembly, some of the most commonly exercised powers of the General Assembly include initiating studies to obtain further information about a topic of concern, considering reports resulting from such studies, and making specific recommendations to the Security Council about actions to be taken to address a situation. The DISEC committee specifically considers measures to advance disarmament, regulation of armaments, and threats to international security. Since its formation in 1946 to reach an agreement about the role of atomic energy in the international armament sphere, the DISEC committee has dealt with issues such as nuclear energy, weapons of mass destruction, the illicit arms trade, and regional armed conflicts. Most of the resolutions that the DISEC committee produces make recommendations to the Security Council to take specific actions regarding such issues.

To prepare for the conference, I encourage you to use the background guide as your starting point, and try to use the questions to guide your research. We look forward to hearing the unique solutions you will all come up with to address the issues at hand.

We are both excited to meet you all at this year's conference. If you have any questions before then, please feel free to email me (erika.ogino.20@dartmouth.edu) or Jessica (Jessica.E.Kobsa.20@dartmouth.edu). See you all in the spring!

Sincerely,
Erika Ogino and Jessica Kobsa

William Tremml
Secretary-General

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Bill Kosmidis
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Jessica Campinile
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Topic 1: Nuclear Terrorism

Historical Background:

Nuclear Weapons and the NPT:

Nuclear weapon development began during World War Two with the Manhattan Project, a project established in 1942, led by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom and Canada, to produce nuclear weapons. Three years later, the United States conducted its first nuclear test in July, and dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August. Less than a year later, on January 24, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly called for the elimination of nuclear weapons in its first resolution.

On March 5, 1970, the treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered force, and since then, a total of 190 parties have joined the NPT. The NPT is a “landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.”¹

The treaty limits the possession of nuclear weapons to the five recognized nuclear weapon states: US, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France. These five nuclear weapon states have a responsibility to the non-nuclear weapon states to share the benefits of nuclear technology as long as the non-nuclear weapon states remain nuclear weapon free. North Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan are currently not members of the NPT.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental forum that aims to increase cooperation regarding scientific and technical aspects of the nuclear field. The IAEA reports to both the GA and the security council. Through its inspections, the IAEA is responsible for ensuring that the conditions of the treaty are met. “The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while

¹ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA." *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.”²

Terrorism and the UN:

Concerning terrorism, the United Nations established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) after the September 11 attacks. The UN currently has the following framework to fight terrorism³:

1. Addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
2. Preventing and combatting terrorism;
3. Building Member States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard;
4. Ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for countering terrorism.

In addition to the CTC, the UN has the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and the UN Counter Terrorism Centre.

Nuclear Terrorism:

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the responsibility of maintaining the nuclear facilities and materials. However, due to the lack of funds and the size of the task, Russia was unable to maintain its responsibilities. Thus, between 1992 and 1997, there were six incidents of nuclear theft. “More fissile material is known to have been stolen from the former Soviet Union [in that time period] than the United States managed to produce in the first three years of the Manhattan Project.”⁴

Abdul Qadeer Khan, a physicist from Pakistan who worked with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), is believed to have been responsible for giving nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Additionally, another individual with PAEC, former director Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood met with Osama bin Laden. Although Mahmood claims to not have revealed any information when asked by Bin Laden

²Ibid

³ "Counter Terrorism." *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

⁴Kane, Samuel. *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Security, the Nonproliferation Regime, and the Threat of Terrorist Nukes*. N.p.: GlobalSolutions.org, Summer 2012. PDF.



about how to construct a nuclear bomb, the potential of such a conversation itself is disturbing.

Between 1993 and 2008, there were a total of 421 incidents of theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive materials reported to the IAEA by member states.⁵ Although these occurrences did not directly lead to a nuclear terrorism incident, the lack of security of nuclear materials and technology would make it very easy for terrorist groups to develop or acquire their own weapons.

Important Treaties and Conventions:

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM):

The convention, which entered force in 1987, is the “only international legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material.”⁶ The convention currently has 44 signatories and 155 parties, including the majority of European, North American and South American nations. While the original convention only covered international transport of nuclear materials, the new amendment proposed in 2005 and entered into force in 2016, also covers domestic transport and international cooperation if materials are ever lost or stolen.⁷

The importance of this treaty lies in its legally binding nature. Additionally, this treaty attempts to address the issue of nuclear material security, an important step in preventing nuclear terrorism. Keeping in mind the strengths and limitations of this treaty, delegates should use it as a basis for the clauses in their resolutions regarding nuclear material security.

International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism:

⁵*Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet*. N.p.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 10 Apr. 2010. PDF.

⁶“Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material | International Atomic Energy Agency*. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

⁷“International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” *Convention of Physical Protection*. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

The Convention makes it an obligation for States to punish offenses within the scope of the convention accordingly under national law and considering the gravity of criminal offenses related to nuclear terrorism.⁸ The convention was unanimously approved by the General Assembly.

Delegates should reference this treaty to understand the multifaceted nature of this issue and aim to address all aspects in their resolutions.

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT):

The FMCT aimed to impose restriction on fissile material, specifically the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, on the nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT signatory states.⁹

The importance of this issue will be further explained in the Nuclear Materials Security section of the background guide.

Current Situation:

Recent terrorist attacks:

Despite the efforts of the various counterterrorism bodies within the UN, in 2016 alone, there were around 1,500 attacks worldwide and 13,542 fatalities.¹⁰ Terrorists attacks are increasing year by year as can be seen in Figure 1 below. Terrorism has become the focus of several countries worldwide. While none of the fatalities from terrorist attacks this year were a result of nuclear terrorism, the issue remains pertinent as the potential number of fatalities of an act of nuclear terrorism would greatly surpass the death toll of any previous attack.

⁸ “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

⁹ Kimball, Daryl. “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance | Arms Control Association*. Arms Control Association, 26 Aug. 2013. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

¹⁰ “2016 Terrorist Attacks.” *2016 Terrorist Attacks*. Esri Story Maps, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.




Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents 2000-2013 ¹¹

Global stockpile of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials:

It takes about 25kg of HEU (highly enriched uranium) and one year to make one improvised nuclear device.¹² “In 2015, the global stockpile of nuclear weapons was estimated at over 15,800 weapons, with the United States and Russia together holding about 14,700 of these weapons and the other seven nuclear weapon states holding a combined total of about 1100 weapons....The global stockpile of HEU at the end of 2014 was about 1370 ± 125 tons, enough for more than 76,000 simple, first generation fission implosion weapons.”¹³

Global stockpiling increases the risk of a nuclear terrorism attack. For terrorist groups planning to create their own nuclear weapons, the stockpiles of HEU could be a target. For terrorist groups unable to create their own nuclear weapons, stealing weapons is an option. The more weapons and materials available to steal, the greater the option for terrorists. Therefore, members of the committee should consider recommendations for the regulation of these stockpiles to perhaps limit their numbers or ensure that they are secured properly.

¹¹ McClellan, Daniel O. "Some Facts & Recommendations About Terrorism." *Daniel O McClellan*. WordPress, 14 Jan. 2015. Web. 08 Dec. 2016.

¹²*Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet*. N.p.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 10 Apr. 2010. PDF.

¹³ *Global Fissile Material Report 2015*. Rep. N.p.: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2015. Print.

Nuclear Terrorism:

In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama stated that nuclear terrorism “is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”¹⁴

With the evermore increasing presence and power of these terrorist groups “nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing.”¹⁵ According to the Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet, four terrorist groups, Al Qaeda, Chechnya-based separatists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Aum Shinrikyo, have shown interest in developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, five terrorist groups are thought to be capable of acquiring and using nuclear weapons, Al Qaeda, North Caucasus-based separatists, Lashkar-e-Tayyib, Hezbollah, Taliban, and two groups, Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda, have attempted to buy nuclear material on the black market.

Nuclear material security

It is believed that in 2002, Chechen rebels stole nuclear materials, possibly including plutonium, from a nuclear facility in Rostov, Russia. Currently, Russia is believed to have about 400 tonnes of plutonium that is considered “at risk” by experts because of poor security. As a result, the G8 groups have pledged \$20 million to help Russia strengthen its nuclear securities¹⁶

In 2006, a Russian citizen of the name Oleg Khinsagov was arrested for offering 100 grams of HEU to an undercover officer. Analysis of the material showed that the uranium was from a Russian facility. ¹⁷

In 2007, two groups of men were able to break into South Africa’s Pelindaba nuclear facility where HEU is stored. The men were not able to steal any HEU, but

¹⁴ "History." *The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit*. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

¹⁵ Mohamed El Baradei (former director of the IAEA and winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize), February 1, 2009.

¹⁶ Walsh, Nick Paton. "Russian Nuclear Theft Alarms US." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 18 July 2002. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

¹⁷ "Georgia Pardons Uranium Smuggler | Analysis | NTL." *National Threat Initiative*. National Threat Initiative, 23 June 2010. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.



were able to surpass several security measures such as an electronically sealed control room, security fence, and alarm.¹⁸ Another security breach occurred in 2012, but again no HEU was stolen.

Recent 2015 NPT meeting

“At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, States parties examined the implementation of the Treaty’s provisions since 2010. Despite intensive consultations, the Conference was not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.”¹⁹ The inability to reach a consensus was seen as a set back by many.

“By all accounts, the failure of the 2015 conference to produce a consensus outcome document with any substance can be attributed to the discussions around the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, an issue linked to a resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.”²⁰

Delegates should keep in mind the failures of the recent NPT conference and aim to overcome differences in the new resolution.

Nuclear Security Summit:

The Nuclear Security Summit began in 2010 when leaders from 47 different countries (including the Permanent 5 member countries of the security council (P5), Israel, and Pakistan,) and three international organizations (The European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations) met in Washington with the following goals²¹:

¹⁸“South Africa.” *NTI*. National Threat Initiative, Sept. 2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

¹⁹ “2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 27 April to 22 May 2015.” *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

²⁰Wan, Wilfred. “Why the 2015 NPT Review Conference Fell Apart - United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.” *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*. United Nations University, 28 May 2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

²¹ “History.” *The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit*. N.p., n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

- Minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU);
- Bolstering security at nuclear facilities through enhanced national regulations and implementation of best practices;
- Enhanced membership in international instruments and organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- Instituting measures to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials; and,
- Centers of Excellence, build capacity, develop technology and coordinate assistance on nuclear security.

So far, the summit and its members have achieved the following²²:

- Removal and/or disposition of over 3.2 metric tons of vulnerable HEU and plutonium material.
- Completely removing HEU from 12 countries – Austria, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Libya, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
- Verified shutdown or successful conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel use of 24 HEU research reactors and isotope production facilities in 15 countries, including Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- Completion of physical security upgrades at 32 buildings storing weapons-usable fissile materials.
- Installation of radiation detection equipment at 328 international border crossings, airports, and seaports to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials

While the achievements of the summit have addressed the points regarding nuclear materials and security, the summit has not yet accomplished its goals of enhancing membership in organizations such as the IAEA and coordinating activities. Perhaps delegates will be able to address these areas in their resolutions.

²² Ibid.



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Bloc positions:

Nuclear weapon states:

USA:

The United States has played a key role concerning this issue. Since 2010, they have donated \$70 million to the IAEA. President Obama listed combatting nuclear terrorism as one of the United States' top priorities, calling it "the single most important threat"²³ However, with the new presidency, the United States' position concerning nuclear weapons may change as suggested by recent tweets by President Donald Trump: "The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes."²⁴

The State Department's Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program (CNSP) aims "to strengthen capacity to investigate nuclear smuggling networks, secure materials in illegal circulation, and prosecute the criminals who are involved."²⁵ In order to accomplish its goals, the program addresses the limitations of other countries. In countries where it is not illegal to possess or traffic dangerous radioactive or nuclear materials or countries where there is not adequate prosecution and sentencing of these individuals, the CNSP works with the governments to change laws. CNSP also provides training to police, prosecutors, and judges to ensure smooth prosecution of these criminals.

The United States fears that "There are two primary pathways by which terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon: by directly acquiring a nuclear weapon itself from a nuclear weapons state's arsenal, or by acquiring enough nuclear materials to construct an improvised nuclear device."²⁶ While the United States, along with the UK and France, have been incident-free in terms of security breaches to their nuclear facilities, nuclear security remains a priority.

²³ Gottemoeller, Rose. "The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism." *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State, 18 Sept. 2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

²⁴ Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). "The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes." 22 Dec. 2016. 11:50 AM. Tweet.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

France:

In France, about 75% of the country's energy comes from nuclear power. In 2015 alone, there were six incidents of terrorist attacks that affected the country. Being a country that has experienced several terrorist attacks and is a nuclear weapon state, France acknowledges the urgency of the issue of nuclear terrorism. France has taken several actions against nuclear terrorism. France considers the CPPNM a valuable starting point for this issue and believes export control is an important part of the solution.

In the past, France has helped countries such as Russia increase nuclear security. In Russia, France secured "two Alfa-class nuclear submarine reactor cores, 898 nuclear fuel assemblies and the radioactive sources (strontium) of 16 radioisotope thermoelectric generators, updated the nuclear reprocessing facilities at the Mayak complex (Russia) and helped build a secure radioactive materials storage site (Ukraine, Vector project)."²⁷ In Pakistan, France helped the country obtain vehicles to detect nuclear and radioactive material at the border.

China:

China's stockpile of nuclear weapons is believed to be between 200 and 300 warheads. Regarding nuclear terrorism, China has mainly focused on nuclear material and facilities security. China has established a licensing system consisting of four components: a licensing system, the state system of accounting and control of nuclear materials, a physical protection system for all nuclear materials and facilities, and domestic inspection. Regarding the facilities themselves. China has increased its security by adding "video- frequency surveillance, microwave detectors, Doppler infrared detectors, and tensile detection systems."²⁸ China has also developed an emergency response plan to deal with possible incidents of nuclear terrorism.

²⁷ Maedi. "Nuclear Security and Combating Nuclear Terrorism." *Nuclear Security and Combating Nuclear Terrorism*. France TNP, n.d. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.

²⁸ Yunhua, Zoo. "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Security, the Nonproliferation Regime, and the Threat of Terrorist Nukes." *The Nonproliferation Review* 13.2 (2006): 253-73. *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism*. The Nonproliferation Review. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.



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United Kingdom:

The United Kingdom has pledged to continue leading efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. The UK has pledged more than \$12 million in 2016 alone to improve standards worldwide. Examples of how this funding will be used include funding for Interpol's Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and World Institute for Nuclear Security Academy to provide online nuclear security training to the nuclear industry worldwide.^{29 30}

Russia:

Russia historically has had problems with nuclear materials being stolen from its facilities. However, with the help of the United States and various initiatives (notably the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program), Russia has been able to decrease its stockpile of uranium. However, critics have pointed out that while the programs have reduced the size of Russia's nuclear arsenal, little has been done to address the security of Russian nuclear infrastructure. In fact, the National Nuclear Safety Administration has "identified approximately 220 buildings at fifty-two sites...that are in dire need of treatment."³¹

Non NPT countries:

India:

A nuclear weapon race took place between India and Pakistan after India exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1974 and a second in 1998.³² India refuses to sign the NPT because of the nuclear threats from neighbors Pakistan and China, and believes in the power of a nuclear deterrent. India does not want to have to rely on the nuclear weapon states. Although no security

breaches have occurred at India's nuclear facilities, due to the lack of transparency about the security systems in place, India's facilities are a cause for concern.

Pakistan:

Pakistan exploded two sets of nuclear tests in response to India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. Pakistan's nuclear program has previously been linked with China's program. Pakistan is not a member of the NPT but has stated that they would be willing to join if they can be recognized as a nuclear weapon state or if India gives up its nuclear arsenal.

"In Pakistan, the threat of nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands is a multi-faceted danger, composed of several different scenarios, such as (1) insiders within the Pakistani nuclear program proliferating nuclear assets and knowledge to terrorist groups; (2) a terrorist group stealing nuclear materials from a Pakistani facility; and (3) a radical Islamist group seizing control of the Pakistani government and nuclear arsenal, through a coup or democratic elections."³³

Recently Pakistan has established the Personnel Reliability Program to screen and monitor individuals who have access to information of its nuclear program to prevent the likes of a second A.Q. Khan. A. Q. Khan was a nuclear physicist who returned to Pakistan to help his country develop their nuclear program. He evaded controls by buying the necessary materials in pieces rather than as a whole. However, from the 1980s, Khan developed a network to transfer nuclear material and technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Although this network was destroyed in 2004, the threat of similar network emerging remains and should be addressed by the committee.

Until 2000 with the creation of the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan did not have any guidelines regarding the exports of its nuclear assets. Furthermore, in 2004, Pakistan passed the "Export Control on Goods Technologies, Material, and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act" to create a body called the Strategic Export Control Division to overlook nuclear exports.

²⁹ "National Progress Report: United Kingdom." *The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit*. Nuclear Security Summit, 31 Mar. 2016. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.

³⁰ "National Statement: United Kingdom." *The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit*. Nuclear Security Summit, 1 Apr. 2016. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.

³¹ Kane, Samuel. *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Security, the Nonproliferation Regime, and the Threat of Terrorist Nukes*. N.p.: GlobalSolutions.org, Summer 2012. PDF.

³² "India, China and the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - World Nuclear Association." *World Nuclear Association*. World Nuclear Association, Nov. 2016. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

³³ Kane, Samuel. *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Security, the Nonproliferation Regime, and the Threat of Terrorist Nukes*. N.p.: GlobalSolutions.org, Summer 2012. PDF.



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Pakistan has chosen the path of secrecy over security in regard to their nuclear assets:³⁴

1. components of the nuclear complex are separated geographically
2. nuclear storage locations are kept secret
3. nuclear assets are transported without armed convoys to be more discreet.

North Korea:

In 1993, when North Korea denied the IAEA access to two of its sites, the IAEA asked the UN security council to step in, resulting in North Korea submitting a resignation from the NPT (later withdrawn). When the US imposed sanctions on North Korea amid suspicions that North Korea was developing a secret uranium-enrichment program, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.

Due to North Korea's history of buying nuclear technology and its tendency to isolate itself from the world, combined with its grim economy, North Korea may be likely to sell its nuclear technology and materials to terrorist organizations.

Iran:

Iran is currently a member of the NPT, but its status has been disputed because Iran has not complied with the treaty. Iran is not fond of the IAEA and other organizations, considering them as watchdogs for the West.³⁵ Iran's recent actions, such as increasing the production of HEU, has suggested to the international community that Iran is attempting to produce nuclear weapons. An Iran with nuclear weapons would severely disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East.

Iran was named the "most active sponsor of terrorism" in 1984 due to Iran providing weapons, training, recruitment means, and more to terrorist organizations.³⁶ For example, Iran provides Hezbollah, a well-known terrorist group, with \$300 million per year.³⁷ The lack of transparency of its nuclear program

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵ Barzegar, Kayhan. "Nuclear Terrorism: An Iranian Perspective." *Middle East Policy Archives* 21.1 (2014): n. pag. *Middle East Policy Council*. Middle East Policy Council. Web. 22 Dec. 2016.

³⁶ Ayubi, Shaheen. "Iran and Nuclear Terrorism." *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (n.d.): n. pag. Web.

³⁷ Ibid.

combined with Iran's close relationship with several terrorist groups has alarmed many countries. Delegates should consider what actions can be taken to minimize the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and giving these weapons to terrorist groups.

Israel:

Israel has been developing its nuclear program since 1958. However, Israel neither confirms nor denies that the program exists. The combination of "country's small size, overall vulnerability, as well as the history of deep hostility and large-scale attacks by neighboring states, require a deterrent capability."³⁸ Similar to the situation in Iran, if Israel is able to acquire or develop nuclear weapons, the balance of power in the Middle East would be destroyed.

Countries that previously had nuclear weapons:

Historically, several nations have willingly given up their nuclear programs³⁹:

As a result of international pressure, South Africa became the first country to voluntarily give up its nuclear program. South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil decided to give up their nuclear weapons to focus on domestic issues instead. Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan gave up their programs in exchange for either conventional weapons or protection under the United States' nuclear umbrella. Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program in return for improved relations with the West. Sweden decided to stop its program due to difficulty and cost. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had weapons from being in the Soviet Union, but returned them to Russia after the Soviet Union was dissolved.

Delegates should consider if these tactics can be applied to encourage other nuclear weapon states to give up their programs.

Nuclear Free Zones:

Nuclear Free Zones are areas in which countries have agreed to not test, acquire, and or use nuclear weapons.

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³⁸"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA." *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2016.

³⁹ Graham, David A. "Nations That Gave up on Nuclear Bombs." *Newsweek*. Newsweek, 13 Mar. 2010. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.



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Five nuclear free zones currently exist:

1. Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco)
2. South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga)
3. Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok)
4. Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba)
5. Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

Delegates should consider how to increase more nuclear free zones and how to ensure these zones are not left vulnerable to nuclear terrorism.

Questions to consider:

1. How can the limitations of the NPT be addressed? How could the committee prevent another case of non-compliance and withdrawal such as was seen with North Korea?
2. Should there be consequences or a mechanism for sanctioning non-compliant states?
3. How can the committee prevent terrorist groups from developing nuclear program?
4. How can nuclear materials and weapons be secured?
5. How should the committee respond to nuclear programs of terrorist groups?
6. How should the committee respond to states that may be involved in aiding the development of nuclear weapons?
7. Should there be consequences for those who aid terrorists in achieving their nuclear terrorism goals? What should these consequences be? How can these consequences be determined?
8. How can the committee prevent extremist military coups from taking control of a country's nuclear capabilities?

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⁴⁰ Davenport, Kelsey. "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance." *Arms Control Association*. Arms Control Association, May 2015. Web. 21 Dec. 2016.

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Topic 2: Biological Weapons

In September and October of 2001, a handful of public figures in the United States media and Congress received mysterious white envelopes with addresses scrawled across the backs in ungainly, child-like handwriting. However, upon opening the letters, the unsuspecting recipients found themselves the targets of the largest bioterrorism attack in United States history. Each letter contained viable spores of the highly infectious bacterial agent *Bacillus anthracis*. Following exposure, twenty-two Americans became infected with anthrax, five of whom soon succumbed to the infection. The terror resulting from this string of attacks, compounded with the shock of the attacks on September 11th, left behind an indelible scar on the world as a warning of the growing threat posed by biological weapons in an increasingly scientifically advanced society.⁴¹

Biological Weapons Defined:

The United Nations defines a biological weapon as a weapon that disseminates disease-causing organisms or biologically-derived toxins intended to kill or harm a living thing. A biological weapon usually includes a weaponized agent accompanied by a delivery mechanism. The weaponized agent usually takes the form of bacteria, viruses, fungi, prions (infectious proteins) rickettsiae (bacterial parasites), biologically derived toxins or similar substances produced synthetically.⁴² Agents most frequently used in or developed for biological weapons in the past include anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, smallpox, and tularaemia.⁴³ Delivery systems developed for biological weapons in the past include missiles, bombs, hand grenades, rockets, spray-tanks outfitted to be attached to aircraft, boats, or terrestrial vehicles, and systems by which to contaminate food and clothing.⁴¹

Though they are often addressed similarly, biological weapons differ from chemical weapons in that chemical

weapons employ a toxic chemical that causes sensory irritation, injury, temporary incapacitation, or death.⁴⁴ In order to develop a more targeted solution specific to biological weapons, we shall exclusively consider biological weapons during this session.

Historical Background:

Biological weapons in their most primitive form have been used since as early as 600 B.C. During the Siege of Caffa in 1348 or 1349, the invading Turkish forces turned an outbreak of plague into an advantage by tossing the diseased cadavers into the city under siege, spreading the plague among their enemies.⁴⁵

In modern times, many nations have used biological weapons during World War I and World War II, according to both confirmed and suspected reports. Evidence suggests that during World War I, Germany developed and may have deployed the bacterial agents causing anthrax, glanders, plague, and cholera against its enemies, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Though a subcommittee of the League of Nations launched in 1924 found insufficient evidence to indict Germany for using biological weapons, its use of chemical weapons raised significant international concern. Consequently, on June 17, 1925, 108 nations signed the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” otherwise known as the Geneva Protocol. However, in a major shortcoming of the protocol, it failed to provide means of verification or compliance, which did nothing to prevent several signatories from initiating biological weapons development programs in the years following the protocol’s ratification.

Throughout the decade before and the years during World War II, it has been confirmed that Japan conducted a comprehensive biological weapon development and experimentation program. The military unit known as “Unit 731” included more than

⁴¹ “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation.” Page. *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Jan. 2017.

⁴² “Where Global Solutions Are Shaped for You | Disarmament | What Are Biological and Toxin Weapons?” N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Jan. 2017.

⁴³ “WHO | Specific Diseases Associated with Biological Weapons.” *WHO*. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Jan. 2017.

⁴⁴ “Brief Description of Chemical Weapons, Chemical Weapon as Defined by the CWC, CW Agent Group, Persistency Rate of Action.” N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁴⁵ “NOVA Online | Bioterror | History of Biowarfare (Non-Flash).” N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.



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3000 scientists conducting research on *Bacillus anthracis*, *Neisseria meningitidis*, *Vibrio cholerae*, *Shigella*, and *Yersinia pestis*. By 1945, the experiments that Unit 731 conducted on Japanese prisoners and on foreign prisoners of war had killed over 10,000 individuals.⁴⁶

In the following years, allegations began to circulate that many other countries had gained possession of or employed biological weapons. Notably among those accused were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The United States in particular developed a robust biological weapon research program throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Despite accusation that it had used biological weapons during the Korean War, the United States denied using for offensive purposes the weapons that it undoubtedly was developing. At military research facilities such as those in Pine Bluff, Arkansas and Fort Detrick, Maryland, scientists researched biological weapons for both defensive and offensive uses. Weapons developed include toxins and biological and fungal pathogens intended to cause crop failure and famine. Because the United States publicly acknowledged its capacity to develop biological weapons and failed to ratify the Geneva Protocol in 1925, other nations had reason to doubt its credibility.⁴⁷

Throughout these decades, many other nations secretly pursued investigations into biological weapons. Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. Reportedly, the Soviet Union expanded its programs investigating defensive and offensive biological weapons during the 1960s and 1970s, though it denied such allegations.⁴⁸

Instances such as these made clear the inefficacy of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. To remediate the situation, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was proposed in 1972 and ratified on March 26, 1975. The BWC prohibits signatories from developing

46 Riedel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print.

47 Ibid.

48 "A History of Biological Warfare from 300 B.C.E. to the Present." N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

delivery systems and transferring biological warfare technology or information to other nations and mandates that signatories destroy any existing stockpiles, delivery systems, or production equipment intended for use with biological weapons within nine months of ratification.⁴⁹

Though the BWC was proposed in order to support and strengthen the aims of the Geneva Protocol, many signatories of the BWC continued to engage in activities that it prohibited. For example, the US continues to this day to research countermeasures to biological weapons under the auspices of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. However, executive orders issued in 1969 and 1970 terminated the country's research programs focused on offensive use of biological weapons. Furthermore, many other countries likely possess or are researching offensive biological weapons, though the number and identities of these countries are still classified information. Since the 1970s, many confirmed and unconfirmed incidences of state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored use of biological weapons for offensive or terrorist uses have been reported.⁵⁰

Notably, reports that the Iraqi regime had developed a robust biological warfare program in the 1980s prompted the first UN inspection of its biological warfare infrastructure. In 1991, Iraqi government representatives admitted to the investigators of the UN Special Commissions Team 7 that their government had sponsored research meant to develop offensive biological weapons using the bacteria responsible for anthrax, botulinum toxins, and *Clostridium perfringens*, a common cause of foodborne illness. In pursuing this research, Iraq had also constructed several extensive research facilities, some of which still remained after the Persian Gulf War.⁵¹

An attack in Japan in 1995 further revealed the threat posed by biological weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations. The cult Aum Shinrikyo attacked a

49 "Biological Weapons – UNODA." N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

50 Riedel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print.

51 Ibid.



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Tokyo subway with sarin gas, killing 13 people and sickening 6,000 more.⁵² Though sarin gas is not considered a biological weapon, investigations after the attack revealed that the cult had conducted three unsuccessful attacks using anthrax and the botulinum toxin. In 1992, cult members had allegedly attempted to obtain Ebola virus for use in an attack during an outbreak of Ebola in the former Zaire.⁵³

Past Actions of the United Nations:

The Geneva Protocol:

Evidence of the use of biological weapons during World War I directed international attention to use of nonconventional weapons in warfare. On June 17, 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, commonly known as the Geneva Protocol, was signed. It was signed by 108 nations at the time, including all major powers except the United States and Japan.⁵⁴ However, some of those signatories, including the United Kingdom, the USSR, and France, declared the caveat that they would no longer uphold the protocol if any of their enemies or allies of their enemies violated it.⁵⁵ For this reason and for others, the Geneva Protocol lacked strength because it did not provide a procedure to verify possession of biological weapons or detail a procedure to enforce compliance with the protocol. In fact, even after its ratification, many parties to the protocol proceeded to develop research programs investigating biological weapons, though often under misleading auspices.⁵⁶

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC):

After the many confirmed and unconfirmed reports of the development and use of biological weapons since the ratification of the Geneva Protocol, it became

evident that the threat of biological weapons required further address. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. When it was enacted on March 26, 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention (as it would come to be called) was the first disarmament treaty banning the development, production, and stockpiling of a class of weapons of mass destruction in its entirety. Specifically, the BWC prohibited the use of weapons involving bacteria or toxins.⁵⁷

Since its ratification, the BWC has undergone several notable additions. In 1986, the Second Review Committee required the signatories to implement confidence-building measures to reduce ambiguities and suspicions and improve international cooperation regarding peaceful applications of biological activities. In 1991, the Third Review Conference required signatories to release annual reports including data and descriptions of research facilities and laboratories, vaccine production infrastructure, biological defense research programs, disclosure of past offensive and defensive biological research programs, details concerning outbreaks of infectious and toxin-caused diseases, publication of findings from biological research, and information on legislation affecting biological research. The Third Review Conference also established a group of governmental experts to investigate possible verification measures via technical and scientific means. The Fourth Review Conference of 1996 failed to develop a legally-binding protocol to verify whether suspected nations possessed weapons in violation of the BWC. The Fifth Review Conference in 2001 resolved to hold annual meetings of all signatories and experts from 2003 to 2005. Finally, the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 adopted a plan to promote universal adherence and established an Implementation Support Unit to aid signatories in implementing the BWC.⁵⁸ The Seventh Review Conference, held in December 2011, constructed a framework incorporating international security, health, law enforcement, and science to raise awareness of emerging biological risks and strategies to manage them.

⁵² Osaki, Tomohiro. "Deadly Sarin Attack on Tokyo Subway System Recalled 20 Years on." *The Japan Times Online* 20 Mar. 2015. *Japan Times Online*. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁵³ Riedel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print.

⁵⁴ "Geneva Protocol." *U.S. Department of State*. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Riedel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print.

⁵⁷ "Biological Weapons – UNODA." N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁵⁸ Ibid.



Most recently, the Eighth Review Conference met in November 2016, but reached no major breakthroughs.⁵⁹

Bioweapons and Modern Biotechnology:

Other scientists point out that genetic engineering is not necessary in order to produce biological weapons. Bioweapons are often considered the “poor man’s weapon” because primitive forms require no scientific manipulation and can be used without any skill. Naturally occurring smallpox, for example, is an ideal agent for a bioweapon attack today because since its eradication over forty years ago, routine vaccination against it has fallen out of practice in many developed nations. Additionally, smallpox is highly contagious and frequently lethal. Fortunately, existing methods to chemically synthesize infectious agents would likely prove ineffective in synthesizing smallpox.⁶⁰

Though the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has proved largely effective in discouraging countries from developing biological weapons for offensive purposes, ambiguity regarding the definition of a biological weapon has failed to prevent the development of biological agents for “non-lethal” or “defensive” purposes. Several countries, including the US, have begun programs to investigate the use of biological agents against materials or plants. For example, the US military currently conducts research that uses genetic engineering to enhance the function of microorganisms capable of degrading fuel, stealth paint, and construction materials including plastics, rubber, and metals. Though the US has conducted such research since 1998, purportedly for “defensive” purposes, research proposals emerged in 2002 that were likely intended for offensive use. Additionally, in the late 1990s, Uzbekistan investigated the fungal strain *Pleospora papaveracea* as a mechanism of destroying opium poppy, and testing of the fungus was planned to take place in Colombia in 2000.⁶¹

The US military claimed that one of its aims in investigating material-degrading microorganisms was to more accurately target enemy military forces in warfare

⁵⁹ “Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).” N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁶⁰ van Aken, Jan, and Edward Hammond. “Genetic Engineering and Biological Weapons.” *EMBO Reports* 4.Suppl 1 (2003): S57–S60. *PubMed Central*. Web.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

while reducing civilian casualties. This prospect led to renewed interest in research that may have prohibited by the BWC.⁶²

Bioterrorism:

An especially prominent issue looming over discussion of bioweapons is the threat of biological terrorism. While terror groups have attempted to obtain the necessary materials to effect a biological attack in the past (for example, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted to obtain the Ebola virus from the former Zaire during an outbreak in the 1990s), it is unlikely that a terror group would both successfully acquire and weaponize a disease agent appropriate for a large-scale attack with an especially lethal agent.⁶³ However, hostile governments and especially well-organized terrorist groups could feasibly enact a bioweapon attack using a less lethal strain of a pathogen or a small-scale attack such as the Tokyo sarin gas attack of 1995. Concern of a bioweapon attack is especially high amidst the unstable situation in the Middle East and confirmation that the Syrian government utilized chemical weapons in 2016 during its ongoing civil war. The situation could escalate dramatically should warring factions in an unstable region obtain biological weapons.

One strategy that has been proposed to prevent terrorist organizations or hostile governments from obtaining or developing bioweapons is regulating and monitoring access to materials and biological agents that may be used to assemble offensive bioweapons. However, given that many such materials are standard materials used for peaceful and scientific biological research, such an action would also drastically hinder researchers with no affiliation with biological weapon development. Even monitoring and regulating the commercial flow of such materials would likely prove challenging because many materials used to develop bioweapons are very frequently used in peaceful research in thousands of laboratories worldwide.⁶⁴

“Defensive” and “Non-lethal” Bioweapons:

A final consideration regarding the current operation of the Biological Weapons Convention is unreliability of

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Riedel, Stefan. “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review.” *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print



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its member states in reporting their research and development efforts into biological weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention currently requires all member states to disclose all current and past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological weapon research and development and prohibits further investigation of biological weapons for offensive use while requiring member states currently possessing offensive biological weapons to dispose of them.⁶⁵ However, should states fail to disclose such activities or deceptively label certain biological research as “defensive” or “non-lethal,” they may withhold such information from the UN.⁶⁶ This ambiguity in the Biological Weapons Convention as to what activities countries need to report places the moral responsibility of truthfully reporting biological research and development information solely on each country. Without uniform, consistent, and noninvasive verification measures that ensure the validity of all reported information without promoting unnecessary suspicion and distrust among reporting countries, the BWC lacks the necessary strength to uphold compliance. Thus, should suspicion arise as to the reliability of nations’ reports, the international community risks being engulfed in a biological arms race, whether actual or perceived.

Possible Solutions:

While considering possible solutions to this issue, delegates may want to revisit the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to broaden the definition of weapons that it bans, based on the extent of their possible effect, their intended purpose, and/or the technology used to produce them, taking into account modern advances in biotechnology. Another solution may include narrowing the definition of weapons banned by the convention to make enforcing the convention more straightforward.

Delegates may also consider erecting a new regulatory body with the responsibility of monitoring bioweapon development programs and possibly enforcing the convention more stringently.

⁶⁵ “Biological Weapons – UNODA.” N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.

⁶⁶ Riedel, Stefan. “Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review.” *Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center)* 17.4 (2004): 400–406. Print

To minimize the threat of bioterrorism, delegates may discuss allowing the development of bioweapons but taking action to prevent these bioweapons or the raw materials required to develop them out of the hands of those who could abuse them, such as terrorist groups.

Lastly, the Biological Weapons Convention may be amended to include a “challenge inspection,” which is a provision incorporated into the Chemical Weapons Convention adopted in 1992 to prohibit chemical weapons. A “challenge inspection” allows any State Party suspecting another State Party of violating the Convention to request the Director-General to send an inspection team to assess compliance. Though this provision has rarely been used under the Chemical Weapons Convention because it constitutes an allegation of dishonesty on the part of the suspected State-Party, it is likely to uncover more reliable information unbiased by the country’s own interests because it grants permission for a third party to investigate the country’s armaments.⁶⁷

Limitation of Powers:

As a member of the General Assembly, the DISEC committee may resolve to make recommendations to the Security Council regarding these issues, but it has very limited power to take action on its own.

Looking Ahead:

While the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has fairly successfully prevented its signatories from developing offensive biological weapons, advances in biotechnology and changing threats in the international sphere have raised new issues which the Biological Weapons Convention is ill-equipped to handle. With the threat posed by bioweapons ever-mounting as the pace of scientific progress rapidly rising, terror attacks ever increasing in frequency, and worldwide population density mounting, effective action is required immediately to maintain international security.

Questions to Consider:

1. How can the UN adequately regulate and monitor bioweapons and biological research while

⁶⁷ Smith, Jerry. “The Challenge of Assessing Syria’s Chemical Weapons.” *BBC News* 23 May 2015. www.bbc.com. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.



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- promoting trust and reliability in reporting among the international community?
2. How can the UN prevent potential terrorist groups from obtaining access to the materials necessary to construct bioweapons?
 3. How can the UN prevent the development and stockpiling of bioweapons without impeding peaceful, scientific research?
 4. Should the UN implement universal validation measures?
 5. Should a provision for “challenge inspections” be incorporated into the Biological Weapons Convention?
 6. How can the UN ensure that the BWC can adequately keep pace with modern biotechnological advancements now and in the future?
 7. Should signatories be allowed to develop bioweapons for defensive purposes or non-lethal uses?
 8. Could material-degrading bioweapons reduce civilian casualties in warfare?

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